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Summary 
An indication of the problematic consent in a private relationship was given 
by judge Pettiti in his concurring opinion in Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. 
The United Kingdom.1 The applicants were accused and convicted for sado-
masochistic acts on themselves and on other, consenting people in private. 
One of the applicants’ claim was that those acts were conducted by willing 
adult participants.2 The Court solved the case by answering positively to the 
question whether the measure in the criminal law was necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of health in the meaning of Article 8 
paragraph 2.3
 
 In his concurring opinion, judge Pettiti brought out: 
The case could have been looked at differently, both in domestic law and 
subsequently under the Convention. Can one consider that adolescents taking part in 
sado-masochistic activities have given their free and informed consent where their 
elders have used various means of incitement, including financial reward? 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a standard of legality 
of a waiver of a human right. However this standard is applied only in cases 
a waiver has been conducted by a person in public law relationship.   
 
If someone wishes to give up the right he is entitled to, he is not absolutely 
free to do so. Why should the law protect one from oneself? This thesis talks 
about the protection of human rights when the subject of the right wants to 
abandon the right. It educes the reasons why it would be important identify a 
human rights waiver and why it would be legitimate to address human rights 
waivers, whether conducted in private relationship or public law 
relationship, the same way. 
                                                 
1Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. The United Kingdom, 19 February 1997, ECtHR, no. 
21627/93; 21826/93 and 21974/93. 
2Ibid., para. 34. 
3Ibid., para. 50. 
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Abbreviations 
 
ECHR, Convention European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
 
ECtHR, Court European Court of Human Rights 
 
DCFR  Draft Common Frame of Reference, see note 109 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The international conventions prohibiting human trafficking and organ 
trafficking are just few examples of instruments delimiting absolute human 
freedom and autonomy. Humans are social beings, the exercise of personal 
freedom or any other human right may affect other human rights 
substantially.  
 
The conflicts of human rights are becoming even more frequent and diverse 
as more rights are considered human rights. This paper will discuss the 
conflict of rights that appears when a person waives a human right. Here the 
conflict lies between the positive safeguards of autonomy and the exercise 
of the autonomy; in addition the right that is being waived is involved as 
much and this makes the collision of norms even more complicated. 
 
A waiver of human right has not found a firm unitary test in the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case-law. The Court has developed a 
standard test for legality of waiving human rights. However, when the case 
concerns a waiver conducted in a private relationship, the Court, when 
assessing the domestic norms’ compatibility with the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), uses the necessity 
test and evaluates if the domestic law has stroke fair balance between rights 
of the individuals. In these cases the Court does not include the legality test 
in the reasoning. As a waiver of human rights is identifiable also where the 
case concerns a contractual relationship, this kind of methodology or 
approach may appear disappointing. It discards and does not identify the 
waiver of human rights; not to mention evaluate its lawfulness in the 
Convention’s context.  
 
The Court has developed the legality test for a human rights waiver,  
because it is important. The failure to comply with the test amounts to a 
violation of a right. In this thesis, I am going to argue that a standard of 
legality of a human rights waiver could and should be applied also when a 
waiver of a human right appears in a private law relationship. This kind of 
approach could be beneficial to the problem of colliding human freedom 
and human rights. It helps to understand the conflict of norms and to solve it 
with a unified clear approach. As a result the co-existence of waiving human 
rights and exercising human rights seem more sensible and we are in a 
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better position in assessing what the law (the domestic law) ought to be in 
order to comply with the Convention.  
1.2 Research question and delimitations 
I have concentrated my work on private law and human rights law. The 
research concerns the possibility of wider application of a legality test for a 
human right waiver developed by the ECtHR. The research question is if it 
would it be justified to identify a human rights waiver and apply the same 
test of legality in where the waiver has been conducted in a private law 
relationship – by the way of contract.  
 
The paper only discusses the subject in the context of Europe and the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
This thesis stays at the surface of the waiver’s legality test and its 
application, it is about the applicability of the test. While it does discuss the 
test itself, however abstains from critical analysis to it. Whether or not the 
test is appropriate in all circumstances or would need complementation, is 
not the subject of this paper. The paper also will not go in depth to the 
expression of free will in exceptional circumstances, e.g. when a right is 
waived by a mentally disabled person. These limitations are needed due to 
the limited scope of the paper and also in order to keep the discussion on the 
main research question coherent. 
 
I try to answer the research question by analysing the requirements to a 
lawful waiver in the Convention’s context. In addition to the Court’s 
legality test, I deduce the requirements of the lawfulness of a waiver from 
the safeguards of personal freedom – the requirements arising from Article 8 
of the Convention.  I will discuss how the personal autonomy as a freedom 
and the state’s positive obligations therein interact and set legality 
requirements for waiving human rights. 
 
The waiver of a right in a private relationship is mostly conducted in return 
for a compensation. Be it money, a service, the improvement of another 
human right or something else. This thesis touches upon the subject only 
with regard to safeguards of a waiver. It will not provide a thorough analysis 
of the compensatory schemes in return for waiving a human right and their 
appropriateness or legality. There will be no detailed discussion as to the 
balancing human rights, the thesis is focused on the justification of a wider 
application of identifying and assessing the legality of a human right waiver 
as a method of solving the conflict of rights. 
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I have taken a case whereby a waiver of human rights is conducted in a 
private law relationship as an example from the ”other end” of cases 
concerning waiver of a human right one could think of – that is in relation to 
a waiver conducted in a public law relationship. I deal with a human rights 
waiver in private law in the context of contractual obligations, not tort law 
for waiving a right is by nature an expression of a will, to which the law of 
contractual obligations is generally applicable and not tort law. Family law 
or patrimonial law or other specific areas of private law are not covered in 
this paper. The purpose of this thesis is to point to a general suggestion, not 
to provide a thorough catalogue of cases where the test is appropriate to use. 
Therefore, I deal with no possible exceptions to the general rule.  
 
The private law perspective in the analysis turned out to be important as the 
Court’s legality test appears to be analogous to the legal reasoning in private 
law. While it is possible that other areas (for instance, philosophy of law) 
would have added to the discussion, they are avoided in order to keep clear 
focus on the legal reasoning. Therefore, the tackling of the research question 
from other perspectives – including philosophical – is also left for another 
research.  
1.3 Structure and methodology 
Overall, hardly anything has been written on human rights waivers in 
particular.4
 
 I would speculate it is due to tendency to solve conflicts of 
human rights by balancing them in individual cases rather than identifying 
the waiver of human rights therein and looking at the conflict from that 
perspective.  
I began my work in search for the case law of the ECtHR and found that 
actually a legality test for a human rights waiver has been established by the 
Court. When I found out that the test is only applied in cases concerning 
procedural rights, I further looked for reasons why this is so. I did not find 
any answers in the case-law of the Court; the case-law also does not 
explicitly outrule that the test is applicable to other than procedural rights. 
Most of the Court’s caseload consists of applications concerning procedural 
rights and the defendant or other private party to the proceedings is 
obviously in a particularly vulnerable position. I assume these are the 
reasons why the test has been applied selectively. In my study I also did not 
                                                 
4Even outside Europe, the articles published concern procedural rights – see e.g. M. E. 
Horn,’Confessional Stipulations: Protecting Waiver of Constitutional Rights’ 61:1 The 
University of Chicago Law Review (1994), pp. 225-251. 
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find any other reasons for the selective application of the test, which is why 
this paper strongly supports the argument that the test is ought to apply more 
widely. 
 
The thesis consists of three main parts. Chapter two (the first chapter after 
the introduction) analyses the lawfulness of a waiver of a right in the 
Convention’s context. The first part is devoted to analysis of case-law of the 
ECtHR in order to identify what in the Court’s view are the conditions of a 
lawful waiver of the Convention rights. Using search engine of the Court’s 
case-law information system HUDOC, all cases from 1996 up to date where 
a word “waive“ is used as a whole word or as a part of another word, were 
studied. In addition, all the Court’s references to earlier case-law in the 
relevant cases were studied. I bring out the legality test and my conclusion 
from the study that the legality test is not applied in cases where the human 
rights waiver has been conducted in a private law relationship.  
 
The Court’s test of legality of a waiver of a right treats the waiver from the 
perspective of an abandonment of a right. In the second part of chapter two I 
view the waiver from the perspective of exercising a right, the right to 
waive. This right, almost always, falls within the scope of the right to 
private life. The purpose of this kind of inversion of perspective is important 
when the goal is to identify all the aspects of a waiver in the Convention’s 
context. I am going to suggest that the test of a legality of a waiver must 
include also a “negative“ test to the restrictions on a waiver – a test whereby 
it is established that the requirements on legality of a waiver are compatible 
with the requirements of Article 8 paragraph 2.  
 
Critiques on the concept of autonomy vary: some claim the choices not 
being genuine because they have been formed in social connections not 
chosen by an individual; others do not set autonomy in conflict with social 
context and acknowledge the latter in the concept of perception of oneself 
and making the decisions.5 However this thesis does not go into the 
philosophical debate on the genuinity of the will of a person. Individuals can 
and do make choices, even within constrained circumstances and 
situations.6
 
 I deal with the right to personal autonomy in the context of 
current understanding of its meaning in private law. 
                                                 
5J. Marshall, Personal freedom through Human Rights Law: autonomy, identity, and 
integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2009) pp. 57 – 67. 
6J. Marshall, ‘Giving birth but refusing motherhood: inauthentic choice or self-determining 
identity?’ 4:2 International Journal of Law in Context (2008) p. 183. 
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The aim of the third chapter is to bring out the legality requirements of a 
waiver of a right in private law in order to find justification for the claim 
made in the research question. To connect to the main subject I start by 
explaining the state’s positive obligations in private law. I then move on to 
the relevant European private law principles and a domestic law regulation 
and identify the legality requirements to a waiver of a right arising from 
those. I have chosen Estonian private law as a mainstream European 
representative regulation. This choice is not incidental – I have chosen it for 
convenience as I have some expertise in Estonian private law. I conclude 
that the Court’s legality standard shows obvious similarities with private 
law principles and this supports the view that it is legitimate to apply the 
Court’s test to contractual waivers of human rights. 
 
In the fourth chapter I will bring out and weigh the arguments that would 
favour the view that the ECtHR could or even should apply the standard of 
legality of a waiver in cases where the waiver takes place in a civil law 
relationship. As the results of the study show that the standard of a lawful 
waiver is used by the Court solely in cases of procedural rights, it is  firstly 
analysed via a case-study whether the standard could be applicable in case a 
waiver of a right is conducted in a private law relationship – in a contract 
with another person. Evans case,7
 
 as a case where the human rights of two 
persons collide in a contract, is picked out in order to demonstrate this 
possible applicability. The analysis in the exercise is quite critical of the 
Court’s judgement in Evans. This is purposive because this analysis intends 
to bring out the possible differences in the conclusions of the solution, to 
contest the reasoning of the Court. The best way to do that is to point out the 
drastic points where the reasoning could amount to a different conclusion or 
where the different reasoning would have been more legitimate. The 
exercise is not meant to prove that the Court should have come to a different 
judgement; nor is it an attempt to provide a thorough criticism of the 
judgement. I conclude that the application of the standard, as a more 
detailed and coherent approach in legal reasoning could lead to a different 
solution of the case. 
One might ask, what is gained of such equal treatment of human rights 
waivers. This is the question I try to answer in the remaining part of chapter 
four by finding support in the theory of legal reasoning and legitimacy of 
international courts. I conclude that a unified approach and theoretical 
understanding of a concept of a waiver of a right and the adherence to 
precedent, the use of analogy by the way of application of the legality test 
would add to the coherence and legitimacy of the Court’s decisions. I also 
                                                 
7Evans v. The United Kingdom, 10 April 2007, ECtHR, no. 6339/05. 
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find support to the wider application of the standard in the theory of legal 
sources at the Court’s hand.  
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2 The legality of a human right 
waiver in the context of the 
Convention 
In this search for support for a wider application of the standard, I start off 
with the standard itself. In the first sub-chapter I will analyse the case-law of 
the ECtHR in order to identify and explain the standard the Court uses for a 
waiver of a right enshrined in the Convention. In the second sub-chapter I 
am going to look at the legality of a waiver from the perspective of personal 
freedom, because the right to personal life and autonomy therein governs 
the right to waive a right.  
2.1 The ECtHR’s test for legality of a 
waiver of human right  
The ECtHR has worked out a standard for a lawful waiver in dealing with 
procedural rights. The case-law indicates that the Court does not use this 
standard of legality to a waiver in a private law relationship. I conclude this 
from the study of the Court’s case-law.  
 
The whole standard of an acceptable waiver is very well brought out in 
Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2): 
 
Neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 prevents a person from waiving 
them of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly. However, such a waiver 
must, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, be established in an 
unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate 
with its importance [...]. In addition, it must not run counter to any important 
public interest [...].8
 
 
Impliedly, this standard should be applicable to other waivers of human 
rights. In the case of Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium the Court has 
repeated that “... the nature of some of the rights safeguarded by the 
Convention is such as to exclude a waiver of the entitlement to exercise 
them [...], but the same cannot be said of certain other rights”.9
                                                 
8Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), 17 September 2009, ECtHR, no. 10249/03, para. 135. 
  A careful 
study of the Court’s case-law since 1996 and earlier case-law as reflected in 
these cases, show that the Court uses the standard solely in the cases 
concerning waivers of procedural rights. By procedural rights here I mean 
9Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium, 10 February 1983, ECtHR, nos. 7299/75 and  7496/76, 
para. 35. 
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the rights enshrined in Article 6 as well as in Article 5 of the Convention. 
Article 5 stipulates personal liberty and security rights. I have included 
those rights under procedural rights, because the deprivation of these rights 
are safeguarded with special procedural rights. The criteria of the Court’s 
standard for a lawful waiver are now discussed in detail.  
2.1.1 The requirement of a right being waivable  
pursuant to the text and spirit of the 
Convention 
According to the first criterion, it must be established that the text or spirit 
of a right does not prevent waiving them of one’s own free will. The most 
obvious example of a case, in which the waiver would be prohibited, would 
be the right to not to be tortured. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention no 
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. However, one could think of an example where one can waive 
the right to not to be treated inhumanly or even waive (e.g. tacitly accept 
waiving) the right to life. This kind of waiver could be deduced from the 
case of organ donors – organ donors admit the possibility harsh 
consequences, the side-effects that could even lead to death.  
 
In De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium the ECtHR unanimously 
declared that voluntary reporting by the applicants, of their state as vagrants, 
does not preclude their right to lawfulness of detention (Article 5 of the 
ECHR)10. The Court noted that above all, the right to liberty is too 
important in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention for 
a person to lose the benefit of the protection of the Convention for the single 
reason that he gives himself up to be taken into detention.11 When the matter 
is one which concerns ordre public within the Council of Europe, a 
scrupulous supervision by the organs of the Convention of all measures 
capable of violating the rights and freedoms which it guarantees is necessary 
in every case12
 
. It has thus been established that a right to a lawfulness of a 
detention (right to not to be deprived of liberty except in the cases of 
exceptions, listed in Article 5 of the ECHR) is not a right one can waive. 
Reference is  made in regards to the public interest; not as a matter of 
assessing it in each individual case, but with regard to the essence and 
nature of the right.  
                                                 
10De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, ECtHR, nos. 2832/66, 2835/66 
and  2899/66, paras. 64-65. 
11Ibid. 
12Ibid. 
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Public interest (the fourth criterion, below) is thus weighed also in the stage 
where it is considered whether the text or spirit or the nature of the right is 
such that it can be waived. As it is brought below in section 2.1.4, under the 
fourth criterion, it is not quite clear how the notion of public interest should 
be assessed in each individual case. 
2.1.2 The requirement of unambiguity of the 
waiver 
Pursuant to the second criterion,  a waiver must be established in an 
unequivocal manner. In the case of Neumeister v. Austria, the Court 
observed that particularly in the specific field covered by the Convention, 
the waiver of a right, even the mere right to a sum of money, must result 
from unequivocal statements or documents.13
 
 
There is no requirement, that the waiver should be written.  In Borotyuk v. 
Ukraine, the Court stated that:  
 
[...] neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a 
person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, his 
entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial. However, such a waiver must, if 
it is to be effective for Convention purposes, be established in an 
unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate 
with its importance [...].14
 
 
On the other hand, a waiver in writing does not pass the test of legality per 
se either. In Salduz v. Turkey the Court has stated that no inferences could 
be drawn from the mere fact that the applicant had been reminded of his 
right to remain silent and signed the form stating his rights.15
 
  
In Zagorodnikov v. Russia the Court found that a valid waiver (written or 
tacit) is not given in case the applicant has the right (to a public hearing) in 
criminal procedure by the law and he is considered to have waived this right 
by not requesting it (by not requesting a hearing).16 On the other hand, a 
failure to request a hearing when the law establishes such a requirement in 
an administrative procedure, can amount to an unequivocal waiver.17
 
 
                                                 
13Neumeister v. Austria (Article 50), 7 May 1974, ECtHR, no. 1936/63, para. 36. 
14Borotyuk v. Ukraine, 16 December 2010, ECtHR, no. 33579/04, para. 80. 
15Salduz v. Turkey, 27 November 2011, ECtHR, no. 36391/02, para. 59. 
16Zagorodnikov v. Russia, 7 June 2007, ECtHR, no. 66941/04, para. 25. 
17Kysilková and Kysilka v. the Czech Republic, 10 February 2011, ECtHR, no. 17273/03, 
para. 26. 
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In A.S. v. Finland18  the Court gave an assessment on the applicant’s waiver 
of his procedural right in criminal proceedings. The Court came to a 
conclusion that the waiver to object to presenting a video-taped witness 
statement as evidence in the court cannot be extended to a waiver of a right 
to put questions to the witness.19 The Court has reiterated that before an 
accused can be said to have impliedly, through his conduct, waived an 
important right under Article 6 it must be shown that he could reasonably 
have foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be.20
 
 
In Sakhnovskiy v. Russia the accused refused the services of a defence-
counsel, for the reason that he perceived her participation in the proceedings 
as a mere formality, but had not asked to be assigned somebody else as a 
lawyer; neither had he asked for additional time to meet the court-appointed 
lawyer or to find a lawyer of his own choosing21. The Court noted that in 
that context the applicant could not be expected to take procedural steps 
which normally require some legal knowledge and skills and was satisfied 
that the applicant did what an ordinary person would do in his situation: he 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the manner in which legal assistance was 
organised by the Supreme Court22. In such circumstances, the applicant’s 
failure to formulate more specific claims cannot count as a waiver.23
 
 
In  Pishchalnikov v. Russia the Court did not accept confession of guilt as a 
lawful waiver of a right to a lawyer, the government had claimed it to be an 
implicit waiver.24 The Court took the view that a waiver of the right, once 
invoked, must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and 
intelligent relinquishment of a right. Before an accused can be said to have 
implicitly, through his conduct, waived an important right under Article 6, it 
must be shown that he could reasonably have foreseen what the 
consequences of his conduct would be.25 The Court considered that the right 
to a counsel, being a fundamental right among those which constitute the 
notion of fair trial and ensuring the effectiveness of the rest of the foreseen 
guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention, is a prime example of those 
rights which require the special protection of the knowing and intelligent 
waiver standard.26
                                                 
18A.S. v. Finland, 28 September 2010, ECtHR, no. 40156/07. 
 The Court did not rule out that, after initially being 
advised of his rights, an accused may himself validly waive his rights and 
19Ibid., para. 74. 
20Ibid., para. 79.  
21Sakhnovskiy v. Russia, 12 November 2010, ECtHR, no. 21272/03, para. 91. 
22Ibid., para. 92. 
23Ibid.  
24Pishchalnikov v. Russia, 24 September 2009, ECtHR, no.  7025/04, paras. 76 and 77. 
25Ibid., para. 77. 
26Ibid., para. 78. 
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respond to interrogation; in this connection the Court indicated that 
additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for a counsel 
because if an accused has no lawyer, he has less chance of being informed 
of his rights and, as a consequence, there is less chance that they will be 
respected.27 The Court was not convinced, that the accused waived his right 
to a lawyer in a knowing, explicit, and unequivocal manner by giving replies 
to the investigator’s questions during interrogations, even if he had been 
advised of his rights; no further investigative steps should be taken after the 
accused has stated that he wishes to participate only through counsel unless 
the accused himself initiates it.28 The Court did not find that under those 
circumstances the applicant’s statements, made without having had access 
to a counsel, amounted to a valid waiver of his right.29
 
 
The requirement of unequivocal consent does not always mean that the 
consent would have to be explicit as opposed to implicit. In O’Halloran and 
Francis v. The United Kingdom the Court accepted a compulsion, criminal 
in nature, to provide incriminating, even self-incriminating evidence where 
the compulsion flowed from a regulatory regime, which is known to all who 
own and drive motor cars.30 In other words, the Court considered that those 
who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be taken to have accepted 
certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime.31 It 
must be noted that in this case, the Court also considered the existence of 
any relevant safeguards in the procedure, and the use to which any material 
so obtained was put.32
 
 Nevertheless, the test of an unequivocal waiver does 
not necessarily mean that the consent would have to be explicit and not 
implicit; in fact, an implicit, tacit consent can qualify as explicit.   
The requirement of unequivocality of the waiver also means that the person 
of the right is informed of his or her right. This can be drawn from 
Dorozhko and Pozharskiy v. Estonia, where the Court was unable to 
conclude that the applicants unequivocally waived their right to request the 
disqualification of the judge.33 The state had claimed that the defendants 
had tacitly waived their right to disqualify the judge as they had the 
knowledge of the judge being married to an investigator of the case.34
                                                 
27Ibid. 
 The 
28Ibid., para. 79. 
29Ibid., para. 80. 
30O’Halloran and Francis v. The United Kingdom, 29 June 2007, ECtHR, nos. 15809/02 
and 25624/02, para. 57. 
31Ibid. 
32Ibid., para. 55. 
33Dorozhko and Pozharskiy v. Estonia, 24 April 2008, ECtHR,  nos. 14659/04 and 
16855/04, para. 49. 
34Ibid., para. 34. 
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Court was not satisfied that the defendants knew of the marriage solely on 
the ground that they had suspicions about it; the Court took into 
consideration that the defendants had difficulties in obtaining reliable and 
official information about it because they were detained35 and raised the 
issue in the appeal; the second applicant had also voiced the doubt in the 
first instance proceedings.36
 
  
The same is confirmed in Kaya v. Austria, where the applicant was duly 
summoned to a hearing via his counsel who had been required to inform the 
applicant.37 Summons via counsel in itself would not constitute a violation 
on the right to be present at a hearing, however in case the counsel did not 
inform the applicant of the hearing and told the panel that in fact the 
applicant was not aware of the hearing and applied the applicant to be 
heard, it cannot be considered that the applicant had unequivocally waived 
his right to be heard in person.38
 
 
The Court has also noted that the waiver must be genuine. In Bortnik v. 
Ukraine the Court assessed as not genuine a waiver of legal representation, 
conducted in the authority of investigative body by a person who has a 
physical disability, was suffering from chronic alcoholism and belonged to a 
socially disadvantaged group; this could amount to the conclusion that he 
was particularly vulnerable, legally ignorant and susceptible to outside 
influence.39 The Court noted in this context that immediately, when the 
accused was outside the authority of investigative body – in the court – he 
asked for a lawyer and pleaded not guilty.40
2.1.3 The requirement of appropriate 
safeguards to the waiver 
 
Under the third criterion, the waiver must be attended by minimum 
safeguards to commensurate with its importance. It was hard to identify 
from the case-law, what exactly the Court considered those safeguards to be 
or how those should work. The meaning of the minimum safeguards are 
somewhat explained in Poitrimol v. France.41
                                                 
35Ibid., para. 48. 
 In the case, Mr. Poitrimol 
waived, on his own free will, his right to be present in the hearings before 
the court. According to French law, for this reason, he lost the right of 
36Ibid., para. 49. 
37Kaya v. Austria, 8 June 2006, ECtHR, no. 54698/00, para. 30. 
38Ibid., para. 31. 
39Bortnik v. Ukraine, 27 January 2011, ECtHR, no. 39582/04, paras. 42 – 44. 
40Ibid., para. 42. 
41Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, ECtHR, no. 14032/88. 
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appeal the court-decision. The ECtHR found a violation, saying among 
other, that it was a disproportionate consequence for Mr. Poitrimol.42
 
  
In Sigbatullin v. Russia, the Court pointed out that in waiving the right to be 
present at the hearing, one of the safeguards is the duly notification of the 
hearing.43 In Colozza v. Italy the Court held that where a person charged 
with a criminal offence had not been notified in person, it could not be 
inferred merely from his status as a “fugitive” (latitante), which was 
founded on a presumption with an insufficient factual basis, that he had 
waived his right to appear at the trial and defend himself.44 A person 
charged with a criminal offence must not be left with the burden of proving 
that he was not seeking to evade justice or that his absence was due to force 
majeure.45
 
 
In Sejdovic v. Italy, the Court confirmed its position in previous case-law by 
accepting that the accused can be regarded as waived his right to be present 
at a trial, but for the waiver to be lawful, the accused has to be sufficiently 
informed of the trial in accordance with procedural and substantive 
requirements capable of guaranteeing the effective exercise of the accused’s 
rights, vague and informal knowledge about the trial cannot suffice.46 The 
Court however did not rule out the possibility that certain established facts 
might provide an unequivocal indication that the accused is aware of the 
existence of the criminal proceedings against him and of the nature and the 
cause of the accusation and does not intend to take part in the trial or wishes 
to escape prosecution.47 In order to establish the latter, there has to be 
certain evidence, for example, the accused states publicly or in writing that 
he does not intend to respond to summonses of which he has become aware 
through sources other than the authorities, or succeeds in evading an 
attempted arrest or when materials are brought to the attention of the 
authorities which unequivocally show that he is aware of the proceedings 
pending against him and of the charges he faces.48
 
 
In Grigoryevskikh v. Russia the Court took the view that in the criminal 
procedure the national court may be required to verify (double-check) 
whether there is a valid waiver of the right to a defence counsel.49
 
 
                                                 
42Ibid, paras. 35 and 38. 
43Sigbatullin v. Russia, 23 April 2009, ECtHR, no. 32165/02, paras. 46 – 49. 
44Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, ECtHR, no. 9024/80, para. 28. 
45Ibid., para. 30. 
46Sejdovic v. Italy, 1 March 2006, ECtHR, no. 56581/00, para. 99. 
47Ibid. 
48Ibid. 
49Grigoryevskikh v. Russia, 22 March 2009, ECtHR, no. 22/03, paras. 89-91. 
17 
 
In Bell v. The United Kingdom the Court considered the applicant’s waiver  
in a trial by court-martial conducted at a summary-hearing where he had no 
access to an adviser as not valid.50 In the context of a waiver to be 
safeguarded by minimum guarantees to commensurate with the waiver’s 
importance, the Court maintained that the surrounding circumstances of the 
waiver deprived it of any validity from the point of view of the Convention 
for the following reasons: (1) the applicant was directly subordinate, and in 
close structural proximity to his commanding officer, a factor which 
undoubtedly would have affected the free and unambiguous nature of any 
choice between a summary trial and a court-martial; (2) the applicant could 
also have been influenced by the fact that a summary procedure involved a 
maximum sentence of 28 days (and 60 days only if extended powers were 
granted) whereas trial by a district court-martial could have in theory led to 
a sentence of up to two years’ imprisonment; (3) the fact that the option was 
presented to him at all meant that his commanding officer considered him to 
be guilty as charged and, further, that he warranted more than a minor 
punishment.51 The Court noted in the reasoning that the applicant, as a 
layman, was not in a position to evaluate his legal position or, consequently, 
the options to be pursued by him.52
 
  
In Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), the applicant, as an accused in criminal 
procedure opted for  so-called summary procedure, a simplified procedure, 
by which he unequivocally waived his rights to a public hearing, to have 
witnesses called, to produce new evidence and to examine prosecution 
witnesses.53 The waiver was made in exchange for advantages, which 
included non-imposition of life imprisonment, by law the sentence would be 
reduced by one third and life imprisonment in that simplified procedure was 
to be replaced by a thirty-year sentence.54 A new law enacted after the 
waiver had been conducted provided that, where a judge considered that the 
appropriate sentence should be life imprisonment with daytime isolation, the 
penalty to be imposed in that simplified procedure should be life 
imprisonment without isolation.55 The Court took the view that a person 
charged with an offence must be able to expect the state to act in good faith 
and take due account of the procedural choices made available by law.56
                                                 
50Bell v. The United Kingdom, 16 January 2007, ECtHR, no. 41534/98, paras. 45 – 50. 
 
According to the Court’s judgement, it is contrary to the principle of legal 
certainty and the protection of the legitimate trust of persons engaged in 
51Ibid., para. 47. 
52Ibid., para. 48. 
53Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), supra note 8, para. 136. 
54Ibid., para. 137. 
55Ibid., para. 138. 
56Ibid., para. 139. 
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judicial proceedings for a State to be able to reduce unilaterally the 
advantages attached to the waiver of certain rights inherent in the concept of 
fair trial.57 The Court did not consider altering a crucial element of the 
agreement between the State and the defendant to the latter’s detriment 
without his consent fair.58 The Court also contended that the applicant’s 
right to withdraw his request for adoption of the summary procedure was 
not capable of remedying the prejudice he suffered.59 Although the 
applicant would thus have had the benefit of the rights he had waived, he 
would not have been able to compel the State to honour the agreement 
previously entered into, whereby the waiver of procedural safeguards was to 
be offered in exchange for a reduced sentence.60 In the Court’s opinion it 
would be excessive to require a defendant to give up the possibility of a 
simplified procedure accepted by the authorities which had resulted at first 
instance in his obtaining the advantages he had hoped for and had legitimate 
expectation in, because of the circumstances beyond his control.61
 
  
The safeguard of a waiver of a right must warn or draw the person’s 
attention to the right, the substance and importance of the right and him or 
her waiving that right. These safeguarding measures are aimed at ensuring 
that the waiver has been conducted in free will and also that the waiver has 
legitimate (predictable) consequences. The state must act in good faith, 
respect the agreement and the person’s legitimate expectation if the waiver 
has been given in exchange for an advantage.   
2.1.4 The requirement of the waiver being in 
compliance with the public interest  
Under the fourth criterion, a waiver must not run counter to any important 
public interest. This requirement is somewhat unclear; it is not clear whether 
the instant case should involve a subject that is of public interest or if 
waiving the particular right as such must not run counter to an important 
public interest. For instance, the Court describes the lack of public interest 
in Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, where there was a question whether the 
right to a public hearing in a civil procedure was breached (there was no 
oral hearing and the case was dealt by the national authorities in a written 
procedure).62
                                                 
57Ibid. 
 The Court noted that above all, it does not appear that the 
dispute raised issues of public importance such as to make a hearing 
58Ibid. 
59Ibid., paras. 141 and 143. 
60Ibid., para. 143. 
61Ibid., paras. 144 and 145. 
62Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, ECtHR, no. 14518/89. 
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necessary.63 In the case of Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden,64 the Court 
was satisfied that the applicants had tacitly waived their right to public 
hearing. The Court was satisfied on the ground that among other, the 
litigation involved no questions of public interest which could have made a 
public hearing necessary.65
 
 
Judge Walsh’s partly dissenting opinion in Håkansson and Sturesson v. 
Sweden, supports a view whereby public interest to public hearing can be 
general and the public interest in the particular case should not be decisive. 
He argues: 
 [t]he public-hearing requirement of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is enshrined 
in the Convention because the Contracting States thought it was important, 
not because a party may think that it is important. The administration of 
justice in public is a matter of paramount importance in every democracy 
and is one of the cornerstones put in place by the Convention to guarantee 
the impartial administration of justice and the defence of the rights 
guaranteed by the Convention. The fact that the public may not manifest any 
particular interest in a given case is not a consideration. Equally a lack of 
interest in having a hearing in public on the part of one or both parties to a 
suit does not alter the matter. Only where both parties agree to a hearing 
other than in public can the mandatory provisions of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-
1) be waived. Any such waiver of a guaranteed right must be manifested by 
clear and unambiguous words or by conduct from which the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn is that both parties were so agreed. There is no such 
evidence in the present case. In my opinion silence cannot amount to such 
waiver, particularly, as in this case, where there is no evidence that the 
applicants ever contemplated a joint or several waiver.66
 
 
The criterion of compatibility with public interest (like the other criteria) 
arises from the Court’s case-law and not from any specific regulation in the 
Convention. The Convention provides exceptions based on public interest 
with regard to protection of rights.  These public interest limitations under 
the Convention are not identical under each article. Some rights name the 
rights and freedoms of others.67
                                                 
63Ibid, para. 58. 
 The majority of legitimate purposes are 
either ‘pure’ public interests (protecting public safety, public order, health, 
morals, national security, preventing crime and maintaining the economic 
well-being of the country) or benefit the public generally as well as 
identifiable individuals (maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary, protecting the interests of justice, preventing the disclosure of 
64Håkansson and  Sturesson v. Sweden, 21 February 1990, ECtHR, no. 11855/85. 
65Ibid., para. 67. 
66Ibid., para. 4 of the Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Walsh. 
67e.g. Articles 8-11 of the Convention. 
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information received in confidence and maintaining territorial integrity).68 
The ECtHR has found the relationship between human rights and public 
interest problematic, failing to develop a coherent set of tests for 
determining when rights prevail over the public interest or vice versa.69
 
  
Taking into account the interpretation of the first criterion (the requirement 
that text and spirit of the right allow a waiver of the right) above, one might 
interpret the notion of public interest, appearing in both the first and the 
fourth criterion, as follows: 
− under the first requirement, the text and spirit as such must be 
considered and overall public interest weighed asking in particular: 
would, in a case like that generally, the society be interested in not 
allowing a waiver of a right; 
− under the fourth criterion it is asked if there are any exceptional 
circumstances in the case that arise special public interest, whereby, 
as an exception, the waiver should not be allowed. 
 
This suggestion takes into consideration that undoubtedly, public interest is 
weighed under the first criterion and that determining public interest should 
not only be based on the text and the spirit of an article only, but also as 
applied to a circumstances of the case.  
 
The Court applies the legality standard only with regards to procedural 
rights – where the waiver is conducted in a public law relationship. There 
are no indications in the case-law that would contend that the standard is 
applicable only in public law relationship or only regarding procedural 
rights. The waiver appears problematic and also most obviously identifiable 
in procedural issues like waiving the right to fair hearing and the right to 
defence council. The position of an accused in criminal procedure is 
specially vulnerable. It may therefore be the case that the test, generated in 
this framework of procedural issues, has only found re-application in the 
same type of cases. The next sub-chapter looks at the waiver as exercising 
personal autonomy  in order to find out more requirements the Convention 
sets to a waiver of a Convention right.  
                                                 
68A. Mcharg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and 
Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 62:5 
The Modern Law Review Limited (1999) p. 684.  
69Ibid., p. 695. 
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2.2 Legality requirements to the human 
right waiver arising from the right to 
personal autonomy 
The Court’s legality standard discussed above treats the waiver from the 
perspective of an abandonment of a right, focusing on the requirements of a 
waiver aimed at the verification or the genuinity of the waiver and the 
overall waivability of the right. In this sub-chapter, a waiver is viewed from 
the perspective of exercising a right, the right to waive. The purpose is to 
discuss how far a state can or should go on limiting or regulating the right to 
waive. This kind of inversion of perspective is important for identifying 
other aspects of a waiver in the Convention’s context. I am going to suggest 
that the test of legality of a waiver must include also a “negative” test  – a 
test whereby it is established that the waiver’s legality requirements are 
compatible with the requirements of Article 8 paragraphs 1 and 2 in that 
they would not amount to an impermissible intrusion into private life.  
 
Pursuant to Article 8 paragraph 1 of the Convention, everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.  
 
The Court has made it clear that that the right to private life is a broad term, 
encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an individual’s physical and social 
identity including the right to personal autonomy, personal development and 
to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world; also, private life includes a person’s physical and 
psychological integrity.70
 
 
It has been said that the core business of privacy law is about protecting 
personal autonomy.71 The right to personality implies the widest possible 
freedom of choice and the minimum of coerced choices for individuals.72
                                                 
70Tysiac v. Poland, 20 March 2007, ECtHR, no. 5410/03, para. 107. 
 
Regardless of the partner in the legal relationship (state or private person) or 
whether it would be a case of a one-sided expression of will, a waiver of a 
right falls within the sphere of private life – right to self-realisation, self-
determination, right to live the life the way it is wanted, right to develop 
one’s identity, right to autonomy. The right to private life in terms of the 
Convention has some limits in terms of scope and these are discussed 
below. 
71H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘The Core Business of Privacy Law: Protecting Autonomy’ in K. S. 
Ziegler (ed.), Human Rights and Private Law. Privacy as Autonomy  (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2007) p. 17. 
72Marshall, supra note 5, p. 205. 
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2.2.1 Legality requirements to a waiver of a 
right - limiting the right to personal 
autonomy or safeguarding enjoyment of 
private life or acting outside the scope of 
private life? 
When a state is lawfully regulating personal freedom, the freedom to enter 
into contracts and to waive human rights therein, by setting safeguards for a 
waiver of human rights (a legality test), there are two aspects we can detect 
at first glance. The state’s regulation is either interference in private life of 
fulfilling the positive obligation to safeguard it. I am discussing these 
below; I am also going to point out that there exists the third option – the 
legality test might not fall under the scope of Article 8 of the Convention in 
exceptional cases. 
 
Firstly, the state can be limiting personal freedom in that it is interfering in 
the right to respect for private life based on the reasons brought in Article 8 
paragraph 2. Article 8 paragraph 2 determines the conditions which would 
justify an interference in private life: there shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
 
In the course of justification of a prima facie interference with a right, the 
following questions are addressed by the Court: was the interference in 
accordance with and prescribed by law; was it a genuine pursuit of the 
legitimate purposes at the issue; was it necessary in a democratic society for 
those ends?73 The democratic necessity test involves evaluative framework 
of three elements: the nature of democratic necessity, proportionality, 
margin of appreciation allowed to member states.74
 
 In the necessity test, the 
Court weighs, among other, the fair balance of private and public interest 
and if needed, the fair balance between the rights of two individuals.  
The second aspect is that the state could be fulfilling its positive obligation 
to safeguard the right to personal freedom in that it is safeguarding that the 
will of the person is genuinely free and is understood accurately. In other 
words, it is safeguarding that the expression of the will of a person is free, 
calculated, informed, well-established, perceived accurately etc. Given the 
                                                 
73McHarg, supra note 68, p. 685. 
74Ibid., p. 686. 
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existence of positive obligation, inaction of the state amounts to a violation 
of the right to personal life. 
 
Other intrusions in private sphere, i.e. the intrusions not falling within the 
positive obligation of a state or within the scope of exceptions listed in 
Article 8 paragraph 2, are impermissible within the meaning of the 
Convention. However, there is a view according to which the right to 
private life cannot be expected to be absolute in itself and there are limits 
inherent in the right to private life.   
 
The scope of Article 8 has expanded in the Court’s case law over time.75 In 
X v. Iceland the Commission contended that it cannot accept that the 
protection afforded by Article 8 extends to the protection of everybody to 
keep a dog.76 In Tysiac definition of private life77 however the Court has 
abandoned this view. In the 1970s, it was contended that the claim to respect 
for private life is automatically reduced to the extent that the individual 
himself brings his private life into contact with public life or into close 
connection with other protected interests.78 By 1992, the Court found in 
Niemetz v. Germany that a search in the applicants office constituted a 
violation of his rights under Article 8 because ‘it would be too restrictive to 
limit the notion to an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own 
personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside 
world not encompassed within that circle; the respect for private life must 
also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings.’79
 
  
An indication of the not-absolute scope of the rights enshrined in Article 8 
was also given by judge Pettiti in his concurring opinion in Laskey, Jaggard 
and Brown v. The United Kingdom.80 The applicants were accused and 
convicted for conducting sado-masochistic acts (on themselves and on 
other, consenting people) in private. The applicants claimed that those acts 
were conducted by willing adult participants in private and held that the 
criminal law and the criminal punishment breached their right to private 
life.81
                                                 
75See generally Marshall, supra note 5.  
 The Court solved the case by answering positively to the question 
whether the measure in the criminal law was necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of health as within the meaning of Article 8 
76X. v. Iceland, 18 May 1976, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 6825/74. 
77See section 2.2 and note 70 above. 
78Bruggemann and Shceuten v. Germany, 12 July 1977, European Commission of Human 
Rights, Report, no. 6959/75, para. 56. 
79Niemetz v. Germany, 16 December 1992,  ECtHR, no. 13710/88, para. 29. 
80Supra note 1. 
81Ibid., paras. 34 and 38. 
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paragraph 2.82 Judge Pettiti found in his concurring opinion that the 
application should have been inadmissible with regard to Article 8 by noting 
that the protection of private life means the protection of a person’s 
intimacy and dignity, not the protection of his baseness or the promotion of 
criminal immoralism.83
 
 
The individual choice within self-determination needs to avoid becoming an 
untrammeled freedom to all to do whatever they want.84 When considering 
the state’s obligations, the limits inherent in the rights listed in the 
Convention need to be taken into consideration. As for examples from the 
Court’s case-law, the right to life and to be free from degrading treatment 
does not include the right to die,85 the right to not to be subjected to torture 
and degrading treatment does not include the right to assisted anaesthesia or 
any action of the state aimed at terminating life,86 the waiver of a right to 
lawful detention does not have an effect on the enjoyment of that right.87
 
 
In Pretty v. The United Kingdom, the Court gave a consideration to the 
State’s pleading that the right to assisted suicide does not fall within the 
scope of Article 8. The Court contended that it was not ‘prepared to 
exclude’ that the law preventing the exercise of a choice (assisted suicide) to 
avoid what the applicant considered an undignified and distressing end to 
her life, constitutes an interference with her right to respect for private life 
as guaranteed under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.88
 
 In other words, the 
Court considered that the matter falls within the scope of Article 8 and 
therefore analysed whether this interference conformed with the 
requirements of the second paragraph of Article 8. However the wording in 
the reasoning of the Court - ”not prepared to exclude” - indicates that there 
could be areas of private life that Article 8 would not cover. 
Freedom and autonomy in private law and those in human rights law do not 
completely overlap. In private law, freedom should be understood as being 
more than an ability to act according to the values of basic rights.89 Both 
freedom and autonomy are based on liberty; the substance of freedom and 
autonomy means to be able to act according to your own will.90
                                                 
82Ibid., para. 50. 
 The will 
83Ibid. 
84J. Marshall, supra note 5, p. 200. 
85Pretty v. The United Kingdom, 29 April 2002, ECtHR, no. 2346/02, paras. 40 and 55. 
86Ibid., para. 55. 
87De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, supra note 10, paras. 64-65. 
88Pretty v. The United Kingdom, supra note 85, para. 67. 
89L. Fastrich, ‘Human Rights and Private Law’ in  K. S. Ziegler (ed.), Human Rights and 
Private Law. Privacy as Autonomy (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) p. 29.  
90Ibid. 
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may be strange, wrong, emotional, subjective or imprudent; the will in 
private law is not unlimited.91 One can thus describe the conflict between 
individual freedom and application of human rights in this simple way: 
human rights law restricts private law by pursuing objective values; private 
law in contrast must accept that individuals pursue subjective values and 
their own happiness.92
 
  One could disagree with this view by noting that the 
overall freedom, including the freedom to make irrational decisions in 
private relations, is also covered by Article 8.  
At the end however, we come down to a question, if it is important at all to 
qualify the exact scope of private life in Article 8. The requirements set in 
the second paragraph may as well cover all the necessary exceptions. On the 
example of the sado-masochism acts: whether we would regard the exercise 
of sado-masochism as not falling within the scope of private life or we 
consider the law prohibiting it being compatible with the requirements in 
Article 8 paragraph 2  – we would arrive at the same result resolving the 
case.  
2.2.2 The requirements of Article 8 as the 
accompanying test for a lawful waiver 
Based on the analysis above I bring out the following conclusions regarding 
the requirements on the regulation of a human right waiver arising from 
Article 8 of the Convention. This is applicable when Article 8 of the 
Convention covers and is applicable to the legality requirement, i.e. their 
material scope overlaps. 
 
When it is established that the waiver of a particular human right falls 
within the scope of private life, it has to be determined if there is a positive 
obligation on a state to safeguard the waiver. In that case the absence of the 
safeguard is a violation of the right enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention. 
When a peaceful enjoyment of the right to private life is intruded by the 
legality requirement of a human right waiver, the legality requirement must 
have a legitimate excuse, an excuse included in Article 8 paragraph 2.   
 
The Court’s standard test for legality of a human rights waiver93
                                                 
91Ibid., pp. 29, 30. 
 in itself 
expresses most obviously the positive obligation of a state. For instance, by 
establishing that the waiver should be attended by additional safeguards to 
commensurate with its importance (the third requirement), the Court has 
established that a state has the positive obligation to enact legislation that 
92Ibid., p. 30. 
93See section 2.1. above. 
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ensures the freedom of the will of the person and legitimate consequences of 
a waiver of a right. The Court’s standard test reflects this also in the fourth 
requirement – the waiver must not run counter to an important public 
interest. Overriding public interest is seen by the Court as raising the state’s 
positive obligation. Under this option, where the state has the positive 
obligation, inaction amounts to the violation of the right to private life. 
 
A view whereby  freedom of contract may only be limited by domestic law 
as far as domestic law meets the three conditions for exceptions in Article 8 
paragraph 2: legality, necessity and justification in the sense of that 
provision94
 
 is almost correct. Correct because there are very few issues in 
the private law that are not covered by Article 8 of the Convention. Also  
the difference in the State’s actions safeguarding the rights under Article 8 
(fulfilling its positive obligation) and an intrusion into privacy under the 
conditions in Article 8 paragraph 2 are almost inseparable. Almost  correct 
because as said, exceptions exist. 
When we take the other human right into play – the right that is being 
waived – we find ourselves in even more complex situation. How do we 
take into account the particularities of the law of this right? Here fair 
balancing seems to help us out.  
 
This is quite directly confirmed in Keenan v. The United Kingdom;95 the 
case concerned a prisoner who committed a suicide, was mentally ill and 
had suicidal tendencies. The respondent state argued that to require the State 
to protect a person against himself would be an approach inconsistent with 
the principles of individual dignity and autonomy underlying the 
Convention.96 The Court noted that there are general measures and 
precautions which ought to be available to diminish the opportunities for 
self-harm, without infringing personal autonomy.97
 
  
From the discussion in this chapter dedicated to analysing the legality test of 
a waiver of human rights in the context of personal autonomy, I conclude 
that the legality test must comply with the requirements of Article 8 as far as 
material thematic scope overlaps with the issue at hand, in that the 
regulation does not amount to illegal intrusion in private life.  
 
                                                 
94H. J. Snijders, ‘Privacy of Contract’ in K. S. Ziegler (ed.), Human Rights and Private 
Law. Privacy as Autonomy (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) p. 116.  
95Keenan v. The United Kingdom, 3 April 2001, ECtHR, no. 27229/95. 
96Ibid., para. 87. 
97Ibid., para. 92. 
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When we come back to the question of a possible wider application of the 
Court’s legality test for a waiver of human right, there is something we can 
conclude from the discussion about autonomy rights. As brought out, the 
sphere of private life has expanded over time and covers almost all aspects 
of human life. Human rights are ought to be protected by a state in both 
public and private spheres. The same human rights law generally applies to 
the exercise of personal freedom in public law relationship as to that in a 
private law relationship.  This supports my claim in this thesis – the same 
law should apply to the legality of a human rights waiver regardless of the 
nature of the legal relationship where the waiver was conducted. The next 
chapter is analysing a human rights waiver in European private law in order 
to identify the requirements private law has set for the waiver of a right.  
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3 The legality of a human right 
waiver in private law 
In this chapter I am going to identify how private law looks at the legality of 
a waiver of a right. I will use the principles of European private law and 
specific norms of a domestic private law to do that. I will compare the 
private law view to the Court’s legality test. As the research question 
concerns the possibility of application of the Court’s legality test to a human 
rights waiver conducted in a private law relationship, this analysis is 
important; we are interested in the similarities and possible counter-
arguments to the research question. The discussion should lead us to an 
understanding if these views – that of private law and human rights law are 
compatible or comparable. Firstly as an introductory part, I will discuss the 
relation of private law and human rights law to establish or rather, to remind 
ourselves that states have obligations to protect human rights in private 
relations and therefore, the law of the Convention applies.  
3.1 State’s positive obligation to protect 
human rights in private law and the 
constitutionalisation of private law 
The Court has made it clear that a state is obliged to protect human rights in  
private sphere. Mowbray’s study has revealed growing importance of 
positive obligations in ECtHR jurisprudence.98 The duty upon states to take 
reasonable measures to protect individuals from infringement of Convention 
rights by other private persons has been called as one of the most prevalent 
types of positive obligations.99 One of the  reasons in the Courts case-law 
developing the implied positive obligations has been to ensure that the 
relevant rights are ‘practical and effective’ in their exercise.100  The most 
basic way of such a safeguard is criminalising the conduct which threatens 
another’s human rights.101
 
 Domestic private law norms, which limit the 
freedom of contract, e.g. formative requirements for contracts, are aimed at 
the protection of individuals’ rights.   
                                                 
98A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2004) p. 229. 
99Ibid., p. 225.  
100Ibid., p. 221. 
101Ibid., p. 225. 
29 
 
Human rights and private law have originally been two separate legal 
orders; fundamental rights were considered to be individual’s defence 
against the state and did not have impact on private law and conduct.102 As 
the time has passed on, private law has been opened up for 
constitutionalisation – influence of fundamental rights and it is increasingly 
hard to draw a line between fundamental rights and private law; between 
private and public law in general.103
 
 For our discussion it is important to 
shortly remind ourselves of how the fundamental rights enter private law.  It 
is a prerequisite to understand how private law and human rights law 
interact in domestic law. 
The indirect horizontal effect, first introduced by German Federal 
Constitutional Court in 1958 in Lüth, requires private law to be interpreted 
in the light of constitutional law; whereas the general clauses of Civil code, 
such as the principle of good morals, are considered to be the entrance gates 
through which constitutional values may gain access to the private law 
sphere.104 The second concept – the state’s duty to protect constitutional 
rights - was introduced in private law by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court in 1990 in Handelsvertreter;  thus far the concept had been used only 
in the sphere of public law.105
 
 According to this second concept, the state 
has the duty to balance individuals’ rights in private relations, to protect 
when individual’s rights are violated by another individual. The failure to 
act in such a way (to provide the appropriate legal framework) – to balance 
constitutional rights of private parties can be the basis for invoking the 
constitution. In the cases the legislator has failed to provide the legal 
framework where the constitutional rights of private parties would be 
balanced, a party can raise the issue of constitutionality of legislation. 
Raising the issue of constitutionality, if successful, means that 
Constitutional Court (in some countries, Supreme Court) would declare the 
relevant norm or the lack of it unconstitutional and therefore void.  
The constitutionalisation of private law has been criticised among other with 
an argument that the fundamental rights do not offer enough guidance in 
order to be gainful in private law.106
                                                 
102O. Cherednychenko, ‘EU Fundamental Rights, EC Fundamental Freedoms and Private 
Law’, 1 European Review of Private Law (2006) p. 24.  
 From the sceptical view, fundamental 
rights can be a source of what is considered to be a just society, including 
103Ibid.  
104Ibid., p. 30. 
105Ibid., p. 31. 
106J.M. Smits, ‘Private law and fundamental rights: a sceptical view’ published in: T. 
Barkhuysen and S. Lindenbergh (eds.) Constitutionalisation of Private Law (Leiden/Boston 
2006), p. 5. 
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among private persons; also, fundamental rights can serve as a warning sign 
for the private law court that human dignity is at stake.107
 
  
As brought out above in section 2.2 of this paper, the restrictions on 
personal freedom generally fall within the material scope of the rights 
enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention. Although private law principles 
are much older than human rights law, private law principles are nowadays 
viewed through the human rights law. This concerns also the rights of 
Article 8 which is of our interest in this paper. A substantial and at least 
indirect horizontal effect of the provisions of Article 8 between private 
persons is an assumption which is in conformity with the views in the 
ECHR Countries.108
 
  
Therefore, the private law regulating the contractual waiver of human right 
must comply with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention and the 
other provisions in the Convention. The next sub-chapters are aimed at 
looking for connections between the Courts standard and private law 
standard of legality of a human rights waiver. 
3.2 The private law principles and the 
legality of human rights waiver  
Freedom of contract does not mean unlimited freedom in human relations. 
Domestic private law norms safeguard the functioning of private relations. 
In this sub-chapter I will argue that the substance of the Court’s  legality test 
for a human rights waiver is related to private law principles. It can even be 
said that the Court has expressed important private law principles in the test. 
This supports the main argument of this thesis – the test of legality of the 
human rights waiver should be applied by the Court whenever such a waiver 
occurs, including to a contractual waiver of human rights.  
 
In order to address European private law principles in general, I will use the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)109
                                                 
107Ibid., p. 8. 
 as a source. The DCFR 
contains principles, definitions and model rules of European private law. It 
amounts to the compression into rule form of decades of independent 
108A. Colombi Ciacchi, ‘Horizontal effect of Fundamental rights, Privacy and Social 
Justice’ and H. J. Snijders, ‘Privacy of Contract’ in K. S. Ziegler (ed.), Human Rights and 
Private Law. Privacy as Autonomy (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) pp. 56 and 105.  
109C. von Bar et al. (eds.),the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Reasearch 
Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), outline edition. 
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research and co-operation by academics with expertise in private law, 
comparative law and European Community law.110
 
  
The European private law has four underlying principles: freedom, security, 
justice and efficiency.111
3.2.1 Freedom of contract and efficiency as 
private law principles reflecting the 
requirements for a lawful waiver arising 
from the right to personal autonomy 
 As pointed out above in section 2.2, we must 
assume that the waiver of a right falls within a sphere of personal freedom. 
Therefore, in order to bring out how the private law addresses waiver of 
human rights, I will firstly address the issue from the point of view of 
contractual freedom and the closely connected principle of efficiency. The 
other two underlying principles of private law are also relevant in our 
discussion about a waiver of a right and will be discussed thereafter.  
The assumption in the freedom of contract is that party autonomy should be 
respected unless there is a good reason to intervene.112 Under the legitimate 
restrictions to the contractual freedom, the DCFR brings out, among other, 
limitations with regard contracts harmful to third persons and society in 
general, interventions when the consent is defective.113
 
  
The limitations avoiding contracts harmful to third persons and society in 
general entails the legislator’s right to invalidate contracts which might 
harm third persons or society at large (e.g. is contrary to public policy).114 
With regard to the legality of intervention in the freedom of contract on the 
basis of defective consent, the following is important for our discussion. 
Taking an obligation or giving up a right, both concern a consent and a 
waiver of a right. A defective consent can be translated as a defective 
waiver of a right as in a contract people trade their rights and obligations.  In 
DCFR, the defective consent is  recognised as a ground of invalidity of the 
contract; the defective consent can be either misinformed or not free (for 
instance, a result of distress, unfair exploitation, fraud, mistake).115
                                                 
110Ibid., p. 6. 
 Just as 
the state’s positive obligation to safeguard the freedom of will in human 
rights law is explained, the authors of DCFR bring out that these grounds of 
111Ibid., p. 60. 
112Ibid., p. 61. 
113Ibid., pp. 63-65. 
114Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
115Ibid., p. 65. 
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invalidity are explained in terms of justice as well as designed to ensure that 
contractual freedom was genuine freedom.116
 
 
According to the principle of freedom of contract, the restrictions have to be 
minimal. The interference with freedom of contract should be the minimum 
that will solve the problem while providing the other party with sufficient 
guidance to be able to arrange its affairs efficiently.117
 
  
With regard to the relationship between human rights law and freedom of 
contract, the latter is acknowledged as a part of the first. As Snijders puts it, 
the significance of freedom of contract as a substantial element of the right 
to privacy is enormous, both in its content and – in particular – in its 
consequences for domestic law exceptions to this right.118
 
 This means that 
the Convention’s legality test for a human rights waiver, in particular the 
requirements arising from Article 8 paragraph 2, are applicable also from 
the private law perspective.  
Efficiency as the underlying principle in European private law has two 
overlapping aspects: efficiency for the purposes of the parties who might 
use the rules and efficiency for wider public purposes.119 Efficiency for 
wider public purposes are intended for the better functioning of markets and 
promoting economic welfare.120 For instance, consumer protection rules are 
not only for the protection of the vulnerable, but also favourable to general 
welfare because they may lead to better competition thus a better 
functioning of the market.121 Efficiency for the purposes of the parties 
includes minimal formal and procedural restrictions; minimal substantive 
restrictions and provision of efficient default rules.122
 
 The notion of 
efficiency appears analogous to the state’s obligation within the right to 
personal life, the negative obligation to respect private life and the positive 
obligation to facilitate the enjoyment of the right to private life. In other 
words, we can infer that the state has the positive obligation under the 
Convention to provide private law regulation which would facilitate the 
functioning of the private relations. 
 
 
                                                 
116Ibid. 
117Ibid., p. 68. 
118Snijders, supra note 94, p. 116. 
119von Bar et al. (eds.), supra note 109, p. 94. 
120Ibid., p. 96. 
121Ibid., p. 97. 
122Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
33 
 
3.2.2 Security and justice as private law 
principles reflecting the Court’s standard 
test for a lawful waiver 
The other two underlying principles of European private law – security and 
justice – also contain relevant aspects of private law with regard to the 
legality of a waiver of a right.  
 
The contractual security contains, among other, the obligatory force of 
contracts, duties flowing from contractual loyalty, the right to enforce 
performance of the contractual obligations, the availability of adequate 
remedies for non-performance of the contractual obligation.123
 
 For our 
discussion about the waiver of a right, here it is important to note that all 
these concepts are safeguarding the waiver, the human will.  
For instance, if a waiver is conducted in return for an advantage, this 
advantage has to be upheld. In a private relationship, the self-interest in the 
contract acts as a guardian for legality for a waiver. We find the same in a 
public relationship: e.g. in military, where the soldiers waive their rights, it 
brings about the state’s particular obligation to safeguard soldiers’ rights.  
 
According to Smith, restrictions of freedom of contract are justified in two 
types of cases.124 First, where the voluntary entrance into contract has 
severe consequences on the persons future freedom – it limits freedom 
unnecessarily.125 Secondly, in case the self-interest in contract provides a 
weak safeguard against unnecessary restraints of freedom126 and limits 
freedom disproportionately.127 The law that restricts individuals’ freedom of 
contract by prohibiting the unnecessary or disproportionate limits of 
freedom is justified because the state should not help individuals to limit 
their freedom unduly.128  The lack of reciprocity in a legal relationship may 
thus require additional safeguards. The Court’s legality test expresses the 
same view. For instance, in Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2) the Court held that 
where the accused has waived right to full fair trial in exchange for an 
advantage, the withdrawal of this advantage by the State is simply 
impermissible and would breach the principle of legal certainty.129
 
 
                                                 
123Ibid., p. 72. 
124S. A. Smith, ‘Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract’, 59:2 The Modern Law Review 
(1996) pp. 179-180. 
125Ibid.,  pp. 185, 180. 
126Ibid., p. 186. 
127Ibid.,  p. 180. 
128Ibid., p. 179. 
129See section 2.1.3 and supra note 8. 
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Justice is an all-pervading principle, which can refer to ensuring that like are 
treated alike, not allowing to rely on one’s own unlawful, dishonest or 
unreasonable conduct, not allowing to take undue advantage of the 
weakness, misfortune or kindness of others, not making grossly excessive 
demands, holding people responsible for the consequences of their own 
creation of risks.130 Even more importantly for our discussion – justice can 
also refer to protective justice, whereby protection is afforded to those in a 
weak or vulnerable position.131
3.3 The Court’s legality test for a human 
rights waiver compared to the relevant 
domestic private law rules  
 One of the reasons the ECtHR has 
developed the standard of legality in the matters dealing with procedural 
rights, is obviously the particularly vulnerable position of the accused or a 
party to a civil litigation. A person in such a situation is obviously exposed 
to outside  influence and therefore the genuine freedom and autonomy has 
to be carefully safeguarded. The principle of justice is also embedded in 
Article 8 of the Convention - the right to private life. As brought above in 
section 2.2 the states’ positive obligations – obligations to protect and fulfil 
– and the obligation to respect private life are closely related and have to be 
determined weighing different rights of different individuals.  
As we learned, the special legality requirements on waiving a right are not 
unknown to European legal acquis on private law. In this sub-chapter I am 
explaining this claim even further by demonstrating that the legality 
requirements, similar to those established by the Court, exist in concrete 
domestic private law. As brought in the introduction, Estonian private law 
as a typical European or a continental European domestic private law is 
used for that purpose.  
 
As we learned above,132
 
 the ECtHR’s standard of legality of a waiver 
includes, among other, two similar concepts. It must be established that the 
text or spirit of a right does not prevent waiving them of one’s own fee will 
and the waiver must not run counter to any important public interest.  
In Estonian domestic law, this principle is enshrined in the Constitution. 
Pursuant to article 19 of the Estonian Constitution,133
                                                 
130C. von Bar et al. (eds.), supra note 109, p. 84. 
 everyone shall honour 
131Ibid. 
132See sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.4 above. 
133The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, passed by a referendum held on 28 June 
1992, entered into force 3 July 1992. 
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and consider the rights and freedoms of others, and shall observe the law, in 
exercising his or her rights and freedoms and in fulfilling his or her duties. 
This establishes the prohibition of abuse of rights and is a constitutional 
principle of private law.  
 
The Constitution also establishes the principle of indirect horizontal effect 
of constitutional rights, which overlaps with human rights law enshrined in 
the Convention. According to first section of Article 152 of the Constitution,  
courts shall not apply any law or other legislation that is in conflict with the 
Constitution. Pursuant to the second section of the same article, the Supreme 
Court shall declare invalid any law or other legislation that is in conflict 
with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution.   
 
Also, the principle of good faith establishes the prohibition of abuse of 
rights, thus working inter alia as a safeguard for the waiver in contractual 
relationship not to run against public interest. Pursuant to Article 138 of the 
General Part of the Civil Code Act134 rights shall be exercised and 
obligations shall be performed in good faith; it is prohibited to exercise a 
right in an unlawful manner or with the objective to cause damage to 
another person. An action in contrary to the principle of good faith may be 
the basis to leave the contractual claim unsatisfied in the civil 
proceedings.135
 
  
Importantly for the waivability of a right, the private law establishes 
conditions under which the waiver of a right within a transaction, is limited 
by public interest. Pursuant to the sections 1 and 2 of Article 86 of the 
General Part of the Civil Code Act, a transaction which is contrary to good 
morals or public order is void; a transaction is contrary to good morals, inter 
alia, if a party knows or must know at the time of entry into the transaction 
that the other party enters into the transaction arising from his or her 
exceptional need, relationship of dependency, inexperience or other similar 
circumstances, and if: (1) the transaction has been entered into under 
conditions which are extremely unfavourable for the other party or (2) the 
value of mutual obligations arising for the parties is out of proportion 
contrary to good morals.  
 
 
The ECtHR’s standard of legality further contains the requirement of a 
waiver being unequivocal and the requirement of being attended with 
safeguards to commensurate with its importance. These safeguards are 
                                                 
134Passed 27 March 2002, entered into force 1 July 2002. 
135Janson v. Golubev, 29 March 2004, Estonian Supreme Court, no. 3-2-1-41-04, para.24. 
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directed towards the person’s free will and also making sure that the waiver 
has legitimate (predictable) consequences. In Estonian private law, we find 
many such safeguards.  
 
For instance, an ostensible136
 
 transaction is void pursuant to section 2 of 
Article 89 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act. 
Section 1 of Article 83 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act stipulates 
the consequences of the failure to comply with the format prescribed by law. 
Upon failure to comply with the format provided for a transaction by law, 
the transaction is void unless otherwise provided by law or the objective of 
the formal requirements. 
 
Article 90 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act establishes grounds for 
cancellation of a transaction. A transaction entered into under the influence 
of a relevant mistake, fraud, threat or violence may be cancelled pursuant to 
the procedure provided by law. The Law of Obligations Act137
 
 prescribes 
legal remedies in case of non-performance by an obligor, pursuant to Article 
101 section 1, the obligee may: (1) require performance of the obligation; 
(2) withhold performance of an obligation which is due from the obligee; 
(3) demand compensation for damage; (4) withdraw from or cancel the 
contract; (5) reduce the price; (6) in the case of a delay in the performance 
of a monetary obligation, demand payment of a penalty for late payment. 
Private law principles of course, existed long before the Court established 
the legality of a waiver test in its case-law. Both of them regulate the 
transactions of individuals. As shown, the Court’s criteria for the waiver of 
human right echoes private law and its principles. Taken together, the 
comparison of a private law legality standard and the Court’s legality 
standard to a human rights waiver we see the obvious similarities. We can 
also see that the level of precision of the Court’s standard test for legality of 
a waiver and testing the waiver from the personal autonomy perspective, is 
well above the necessity-standard usually applied in cases concerning 
collision of individuals’ rights. This leads us on to the next chapter, where I 
am going to claim that the application of the standard test in the Court’s 
                                                 
136Pursuant to section 1 of Article 89 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act, an 
ostensible transaction is a transaction upon which the parties have agreed that the 
declarations of intention made upon entry into the transaction do not have the legal 
consequences corresponding to the intention expressed since the parties wish to create an 
impression of the existence of a transaction, or to conceal the transaction they actually wish 
to enter into. 
137Passed 26 September 2001, entered into force 01.07.2002. 
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reasoning, in stead of abstract necessity and margin of appreciation tests, 
would add to the legitimacy of the Court’s rulings. 
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4 The application of the legality 
test by the Court to a human 
right waiver conducted in a 
private law relationship 
In this chapter I have gathered arguments, specifically related to the role of 
ECtHR, that would support the application of the Courts legality test for a 
human rights waiver in case the waiver has been conducted in a private law 
relationship. In other words this chapter is going to provide ECtHR-specific 
arguments for the wider use of the standard. I will provide arguments from 
the theory of legal reasoning, the legitimacy of an international court and the 
sources available to ECtHR. I will however start with an example which 
should persuade the reader that the test is appropriate to use in the reasoning 
of the ECtHR in cases concerning human rights waiver conducted in a 
private law relationship. 
4.1 The applicability of the Court’s 
standard in case a waiver is 
conducted in a civil law relationship – 
an exercise 
I have provided above that the Court’s legality test is similar to private law 
legality test for a waiver of a right. The role of ECtHR is different than that 
of a domestic court – it only evaluates the domestic court’s decision and 
domestic law taking into consideration the requirements of the Convention 
and the obligations of the state. One might thus ask if the legality test for a 
human right waiver is suitable for the ECtHR to use when its primary 
business is not to evaluate the private legal relationship in particular. In this 
sub-chapter I am going to demonstrate that the Court’s legality test for a 
human right waiver is applicable in cases before the Court concerning a 
contractual waiver of a right. In fact, the Court can use the standard in the 
very same way it uses it in cases concerning public law relationship – by 
evaluating if the domestic law that governs the human right waiver is in 
conformity with the test. I have picked Evans v. The United Kingdom138
                                                 
138 Supra note 7. 
 as 
an example of the Court’s ruling concerning a waiver of human right in 
private sphere. Ms Natallie Evans waived the future right to have biological 
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children in very obscure circumstances. She chose to freeze only embryos 
and not her eggs before her ovaries were removed; she was stressed and in a 
hurry, her partner had promised her that he would not withdraw his consent 
to use the embryos. The domestic law however did not recognise such an 
agreement as valid. Ms Evans’es partner reconsidered his decision. 
4.1.1 The circumstances of Evans case and the 
Court’s decision. 
Evans v. The United Kingdom has been cited by the Court as a case where 
there court established that Article 8 includes the right to respect for both 
the decisions - to have and not to have a child.139
 
  
Ms Natallie Evans (“the applicant”) was informed during a treatment in a 
clinic that her ovaries would have to be removed due to a medical condition. 
It was possible, quickly, to first to extract some eggs for in vitro fertilisation 
(“IVF”).  As regards to creating and freezing embryos, under the domestic 
law and according to the forms to be signed, it would be possible for either 
of the parties to withdraw his or her consent at any time before the embryos 
were implanted in the applicant’s uterus. Freezing and saving unfertilised 
eggs mean lower rate of success in becoming pregnant; also it couldn’t have 
been conducted in that clinic. J, the applicant’s partner reassured the 
applicant that they were not going to split up and that he wanted to become 
the father of her children. The couple signed forms required by the law and 
the fertilisation of embryos was conducted successfully; the embryos were 
frozen. Ms Evans underwent a surgery whereby her ovaries were removed. 
When ready to have embryos implanted in her uterus, J withdrew his 
consent. The couple’s relationship had ended. The law had established, as a 
matter of public policy, that it would have been impossible for J to give an 
unequivocal consent to use the embryos, no matter how the circumstances 
change. In other words, J’s assurance that he would not withdraw his 
consent to use the embryos was void. 
 
I will now provide a summary of the reasoning of the Court and the 
dissenting judges. The summary is quite lengthy and this is purposive. In 
order to persuade the reader that another way of reasoning would be more 
appropriate, we’d need a starting point to be able to judge and compare. 
 
With regard to possible violation of Article 8, in its judgement, the Grand 
Chamber140
                                                 
139E.B. v. France, 22 January 2008, ECtHR, no. 43546/02, para. 43. 
 attached importance to the following: 
140I.e. the majority of the Grand Chamber, nine votes out of thirteen. 
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− the legislation in question served a number of wider, public interests, 
in upholding the principle of the primacy of consent and promoting 
legal clarity and certainty, for example141
− positive obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed 
to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of 
individuals between themselves
; 
142
− regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck 
between the competing interests; and in both contexts the State 
enjoys a certain margin of appreciation
; 
143
− the principal issue, is whether the legislative provisions as applied in 
the present case struck a fair balance between the competing public 
and private interests involved;
; 
144
− where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or 
identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted. 
Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member States of 
the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the 
interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly 
where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin 
will be wider. There will also usually be a wide margin if the State is 
required to strike a balance between competing private and public 
interests or Convention rights;
 
145
− there is no consensus among member States as to the stage in IVF 
treatment when the gamete providers’ consent becomes irrevocable; 
there is no clear consensus that in the very circumstances, Ms 
Evans’es rights under article 8 should take precedence over J’s;
 
146
− it is legitimate – and indeed desirable - for a State to set up a legal 
scheme which takes this possibility of delay in IVF treatment 
(compared to fertilisation through sexual intercourse)  into 
account;
 
147
− while the pressing nature of the applicant’s medical condition 
required her to make a decision quickly and under extreme stress, 
she knew, when consenting to have all her eggs fertilised with J’s 
sperm, that these would be the last eggs available to her, that it 
would be some time before her cancer treatment was completed and 
any embryos could be implanted, and that, as a matter of law, J 
would be free to withdraw consent to implantation at any moment;
 
148
                                                 
141Evans v. The United Kingdom, supra note 7, para. 74. 
 
142Ibid., para. 75. 
143Ibid. 
144Ibid., para. 76. 
145Ibid., para. 77. 
146Ibid., paras. 78 and 79. 
147Ibid., para. 84. 
148Ibid., para. 88. 
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− the absolute nature of the rule served to promote legal certainty and 
to avoid the problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in 
weighing, on a case by case basis. Also the absolute rule served to 
promote respect for human dignity and free will, as well as a desire 
to ensure a fair balance between the parties to IVF treatment, 
underlay the legislature’s decision to enact provisions permitting of 
no exception to ensure that every person donating gametes for the 
purpose of IVF treatment would know in advance that no use could 
be made of his or her genetic material without his or her continuing 
consent;149
− the applicant’s right to respect for the decision to become a parent in 
the genetic sense should not be accorded greater weight than J’s 
right to respect for his decision not to have a genetically-related 
child with her. It would have been possible for Parliament to 
regulate the situation differently. However, the central question 
under Article 8 is not whether different rules might have been 
adopted by the legislature, but whether, in striking the balance at the 
point at which it did, Parliament exceeded the margin of appreciation 
afforded to it under that Article.
 
150
− the Parliament had struck fair balance, because there is no European 
consensus and the clear rules were brought to applicant’s 
attention.
 
151
 
  
The dissenting opinion of judges Türmen, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Spielmann 
and Ziemele found a violation of the rights enshrined in both, Article 8 and 
that in conjunction with Article 14.152
− the case should have been analysed not as one concerning state’s 
positive obligations, but as an interference in the applicant’s private 
life;
 Their arguments, concerning the 
violation of Article 8, were: 
153
− it is uncontested that the interference had a legitimate aim, was 
prescribed by law. However, it was not proportionate, because the 
rule was absolute and provided no flexibility and the applicant’s 
right’s eradication;
 
154
− the British law failed to strike fair balance and take special 
circumstances into consideration – J  knew about the applicant’s last 
  
                                                 
149Ibid., para. 89. 
150Ibid., paras. 90 and 91.  
151Ibid., para. 92. 
152Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Türmen, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Spielmann and Ziemele. 
in Evans v. The United Kingdom, supra note 7, p. 30. 
153Ibid., para. 5. 
154Ibid., para.6. 
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chance and she, in good faith relied on his assurance; the act of 
destroying an embryo involved destroying the applicant’s eggs;155
− the wide margin of appreciation should not prevent the Court from 
exercising its control – namely whether a fair balance between all 
competing interests has been struck at a domestic level;
  
156
− where the effect of the legislation is such that, on the one hand, it 
provides a woman with the right to take a decision to have a 
genetically related child but, on the other hand, effectively deprives 
a woman from ever again being in this position, it inflicts such a 
disproportionate moral and physical burden on a woman that it can 
hardly be compatible with Article 8 and the very purposes of the 
Convention protecting human dignity and autonomy.
 
157
 
 
From the majority’s and the dissenting judges’ reasoning we see that the 
adjudication only involved evaluating domestic regulation through the 
conventional general principles like the margin of appreciation, striking fair 
balance, etc. The dissenting judges paid more precise attention to the matter 
if a fair balance has been struck in the concrete individual case, but neither 
the majority or the dissenting judges have commented on Ms Evans’es 
waiver of her human right and its lawfulness within the meaning of the 
Convention. In the next sub-chapter, it is explained, what exactly was the 
waiver in Evans and this waiver is put through the test the Court has worked 
out for waivers of Convention rights.  
4.1.2 The application of the Court’s legality test 
in Evans case 
With signing the forms in order to get the IVF treatment, Ms Evans waived 
her right to become a genetic parent in case J withdrew his consent. When 
analysing Ms Evans waiving her right to become a genetic parent, we must 
consider the circumstances of the time when she did that. She was under a 
stressful situation (because of her medical condition and hurrying) and J 
persuaded her that they should pick the more certain way of having children 
– freezing embryos and not her eggs only. The service of egg freezing was 
not available at the clinic. Let us apply the ECtHR’s test for human rights 
waiver to Ms Evans’es waiver of the right to become a genetic parent. It 
should show us, if it would be possible to apply the test in cases where the 
waiver is given in a private relation. It should also demonstrate if this kind 
of reasoning could change the outcome of the decision of the Court or add 
legitimacy to the reasoning of the judgement. 
                                                 
155Ibid., para. 8. 
156Ibid., para. 12. 
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As brought above, under the legality of a waiver test, it must firstly be 
established that the text or spirit of a right included in the ECHR does not 
prevent waiving them on one’s own fee will. The text of Article 8 
paragraph 1 goes as follows: everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence. As the Court noted in 
Evans, the right to respect for a decision to become a parent in genetic sense 
is included in the scope of Article 8.158
 
 It is obvious that the text of Article 8 
nor the spirit of it do not prevent waiving the right to respect for a decision 
to become a genetic parent. Even a tacit decision, a choice not to have 
children, can be interpreted as waiving this right.  
It is not clear from the Court’s established standard, whether it should be 
established that the text of an article and spirit of the right prevent a waiver 
in the certain circumstances of the case or as a general inference from the 
text. As there might be many ways or circumstances of waiving a right – 
temporarily or eternally; purely on a free will or under a stressful situation – 
it is here presumed that it should be examined whether the particular waiver 
in the given case is compatible with the text and spirit of the right. 
 
What we are dealing with, is the decision to waive the right for the rest of 
the life depending only on a decision of another person. As the applicant 
waived her right to become a genetic parent in case J did decide so, it can be 
inferred that really, J was entitled to waive her right to become a genetic 
parent. Furthermore, the decision was in hands of a person who had 
persuaded the applicant that it would not happen;159
 
 he also had self-interest 
in the matter. It could be doubtful if it is compatible with the spirit of Article 
8 to waive the right to become a genetic parent in a way that an 
authorisation for waiving that right is given to another person and it only 
depends on this person’s will. 
According to the second criterion, a waiver must be established in an 
unequivocal manner. The waiver in Evans was conducted  in written form. 
However, as the circumstances of the case tell us, the will of Ms Evans was 
quite the opposite – she did not want to waive the right for a biological 
child; she wanted to have one. She was sure, while signing the forms, that 
these embryos created would never be unavailable for her.  In fact, the 
couple had agreed orally that the consents would not be withdrawn; the 
domestic law just didn’t recognise this kind of contract as legal. One would 
                                                 
158Supra note 7, para. 72. 
159The dissenting opinion in the case also brings out, that the majority failed to give J’s 
assurance any weight at all. Supra note 152, para. 8. 
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have to accept that a waiver conducted under these circumstances could be 
regarded as not unequivocal. 
 
Pursuant to the third standard, the waiver must be attended by minimum 
safeguards to commensurate with its importance.  
 
It could be argued, that the waiver was safeguarded by the written forms and 
information given in writing to the applicant. It may however be questioned, 
if a legislation, which puts such a restriction on one’s autonomy – it would 
not allow an agreement between two persons even in special circumstances 
– has enough balancing safeguards. Let us remind ourselves that the judges 
of the dissenting opinion pointed out, among other, that the legislation in 
question, providing a chance at the same time as totally erasing the chance 
to become a genetic parent, can hardly be compatible with, in addition to 
Article 8, the very purposes of the Convention protecting human dignity and 
autonomy.160
 
 The state had interfered in the private area of life, allowing no 
exceptions from the rule that the consent of implanting an embryo can be 
withdrawn any time. This argumentation could very well indicate, that in the 
exceptional case like in Evans, the safeguards did not balance Ms Evans’es 
waiver enough, considering its importance in her case. 
The fourth criterion demands that the waiver must not run counter to any 
important public interest. 
 
With regards to Evans case, the Court found the law serving public interest 
in that: 
− the absolute nature of the rule served to promote legal certainty and 
to avoid the problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in 
weighing, on a case by case basis;161
− the absolute rule served to promote respect for human dignity and 
free will, as well as a desire to ensure a fair balance between the 
parties to IVF treatment, underlay the legislature’s decision to enact 
provisions permitting of no exception to ensure that every person 
donating gametes for the purpose of IVF treatment would know in 
advance that no use could be made of his or her genetic material 
without his or her continuing consent.
 
162
 
  
When we return to the waiver, we must look, if the waiver itself ran counter 
to any public interest and that is definitely a different one from the content 
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of public interest observed by the Court in Evans case. We must assess if 
there are any exceptional circumstances in the case that arise special public 
interest whereby, as an exception, the waiver should not be allowed. The 
purpose of our exercise is not to solve the issue in its entirety, but to point 
out the circumstances that may be taken into consideration under those lines 
of arguments. Therefore, may it be pointed out here that these particular 
circumstances may refer to a public interest whereby, as an exception, the 
waiver should not be allowed and the exception to the general rule should 
exist because:  
− there was an effective eradication of the right; 
− the person waiving a right was relying in good faith on another 
person’s assurance that the right would not be eradicated. 
4.1.3 The application of the requirements for a 
lawful waiver arising from Article 8 to the 
Evans case 
Now I will address the relevant domestic law’s intrusion into the parties’ 
privacy in terms of contractual freedom in Evans. I am going away from the 
Court’s standard test for a human right waiver and test the domestic law 
with the requirements of the Convention with regard to autonomy, the 
freedom of contract therein. As indicated above, the waiver of a right most 
probably163
 
 falls within the scope of right to private life, personal autonomy.  
From the perspective of the freedom of contract, I observe two aspects. The 
domestic law allowed either of the parties to withdraw from the contract at 
any time and for whatever reason. The law did not  allow the parties to 
deviate from that rule, i.e. the parties could not agree on an exception that 
the withdrawal of this contract was not permitted.  
 
As mentioned, the Court found with regard to the private law relationship 
between Ms Evans and J, that the state had acted within the margin of 
appreciation in striking fair balance between public and private interests. As 
the Court pointed out, it was legitimate and even desirable for a State to set 
up a legal scheme which takes the possibility of delay in IVF treatment 
(compared to fertilisation through sexual intercourse) into account.164
                                                 
163As indicated in section 2.2.2 there could be marginal areas of private life to which the 
scope of Article 8 does not extend. 
  As 
the Court noted, there is no consensus among member States as to the stage 
in IVF treatment when the gamete providers’ consent becomes irrevocable; 
there is no clear consensus that in the very circumstances Ms Evans’es 
164Evans v. The United Kingdom , supra note 7, para. 84. 
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rights under article 8 should take precedence over J’s.165 The absolute nature 
of the rule served, in the Court’s opinion, to promote legal certainty, human 
dignity and free will, as well as a desire to ensure a fair balance between the 
parties to IVF treatment; the provisions permitting no exceptions served to 
ensure that every person donating gametes for the purpose of IVF treatment 
would know in advance that no use could be made of his or her genetic 
material without his or her continuing consent.166
 
 
Taking the perspective of private law freedom of contract, as a right also 
guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention, we can identify two 
important aspects in the Court’s reasoning.  
 
The first one is about legal certainty. The Court’s finding that the rule 
served to promote legal certainty contravenes the provision’s inner nature: a 
consent that a party to the contract can withdraw at any time. A withdrawal 
from the contract and cancelling a contract are ordinarily a remedy in the 
cases of a breach of a contract. This exception contravenes the very general 
and important private law principle pacta sunt servanda, agreements exist to 
be kept, the contract is ought to be fulfilled. This principle serves as the 
main principle for legal certainty in private relations. When this principle is 
erased for this particular kind of contracts, one would expect it to be 
balanced, for instance by the provisions of exceptions. One would have to 
be satisfied with the Court’s reasoning that given this exceptional medicinal 
area of IVF treatment and the areas of personal life involved, this 
requirement of continuing consent could be justified. But could the absence 
of exceptions be justified? Hardly, I would say. Let us think of the worst 
case scenario: the misuse or abuse of this so-called continuing consent; 
which was what happened in Evans – J had promised Ms. Evans that he 
would not withdraw his consent. He did however. This promise was not 
recognised by the law and thus this agreement had zero consequences to 
either of the sides. One would expect however that the law does not ignore 
abuse of rights.  
 
The second aspect is about the Court’s view that the absolute nature of the 
rule served in this case to protect human dignity, free will and represented 
the state’s desire to ensure a fair balance between the parties to IVF 
treatment. From the point of view of contract law, at the very least, this is 
argument appears dramatically one-sided. The absolute rule was designed  
to regulate a conflict situation. If one party to the contract withdraws the 
consent, the contractual rights of the other party cease to exist. Thus 
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certainly, the legislator, ruling in this very particular area of life, and 
enacting the provision for the very particular situation, must have foreseen 
that this is a conflict situation and indeed there is another party to it. In other 
words: when the legislator created this rule, it imagined the conflict 
situation whereby one person from a couple, who has freezed embryos, 
wants to use the embryo and the other one has changed his or her opinion. 
Otherwise there would not have been even a need for this rule. Further, the 
legislator should have foreseen that this particular one side of the contract, 
who would raise such a conflict situation by demanding to still use the 
embryo, is a woman – a man could not make use of an embryo for 
biological reasons. When we think just one step forward – what would be 
the reasons for a woman to desire a baby in the situation where the man 
does not want it anymore? This would not be an ordinary or easily made 
decision for women; I would suggest that the situation of Ms Evans, a 
woman to whom this chance represents the last chance to become a 
biological mother, would become to one’s minds among the first answers. 
Because this is all very obvious, the legislator should have thought of the 
dignity and safeguards of the free will of this woman as well. The state is in 
that situation under a positive obligation to protect that woman’s right to 
become a biological mother. Surely, one could think that the written 
agreement and informed consent worked as safeguards for that purpose. 
However, these safeguards come short when we deal with abuse of rights. 
Again, the law is ought to regulate abuse of rights and the regulation under 
discussion here fell short of that.  
 
Allow me to add that in the judgement in Evans, the Court stressed that the 
right to become a biological mother and the decision not to become a father 
stay at the same level, neither of them stands higher. This reveals another 
controversy in the judgement: if these rights are equal, why is the law that 
protects only one of them and not the other, in abidance with the 
Convention? That said, I find that even from the more or less abstract 
perspective of the margin of appreciation, this absolute domestic rule could 
be criticised. It would be highly legitimate to question if the law which 
leaves the rights of one side in a very obvious situation of conflict of rights 
totally unprotected, could be justified by the allowed margin of appreciation 
in striking fair balance between individuals rights.  
 
The short exercise of applying the Court’s test of a legal waiver in Evans in 
the previous sub-chapter demonstrated that the test is applicable, at the very 
least. The aim of the exercise was not to persuade the reader that the 
outcome of the judgement in Evans would certainly have been a different 
one. The aim was to point out that compared to the application of the 
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necessity standard (including striking fair balance between rights), the 
identification and testing a waiver of a human right raises completely 
different questions and aspects of the case. The indication that the waiver is 
unlawful within the meaning of the Convention, constitutes a violation of a 
human right therein. Fairly enough it can thus be stated that the outcome of 
the decision could be different if the waiver is put through a legality test. 
When we put the domestic private law regulation in Evans into the 
perspective of personal autonomy, freedom of contract, we saw that even 
more ways to go about the case come up and these also raise matters that 
could lead to a different result of a judgement. Most importantly the analysis 
brought out that the legitimacy of the absolute rule as an intrusion in private 
autonomy could be questionable because the probable conflict situation was 
easily identifiable for the lawgiver and because this conflict situation 
obviously refers to a particular victim in case of an abuse of rights – a 
woman to whom it is a last chance to become a mother. 
4.2 Why would the wider use of the 
Courts legality test be legitimate? 
4.2.1 The wider application of the standard as 
taking up analogy would add to the 
coherency and legitimacy of the Court’s 
decisions 
This sub-chapter is going to provide a claim concerning legitimacy.  The 
concept of legitimacy has a sociological and a normative dimension, it may 
refer to popular attitudes of authority (popular legitimacy).167 On the other 
hand, the normative meaning of legitimacy refers to whether a claim for 
authority is well-founded – whether it is justified in some objective sense.168 
The two aspects are closely related since persuasion is one of legitimacy’s 
functions, if not its primary function.169
 
 I use the concept of legitimacy in 
the context of both, the Court’s role and its reasoning in individual cases, 
because the Court’s decisions also provide precedent law and the reasoning 
of the Court thus has a wider influence or a different type of legitimacy. 
These contexts are thus here indeed inseparable.  
                                                 
167D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law?’, 93:3 The American Journal of International Law 
(1999) pp. 596 – 624. p. 601. 
168Ibid. 
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49 
 
I am bringing out the legitimacy of the Court’s rulings as an argument that 
supports the wider use of a unified standard test to a human right waiver. 
Legitimacy of the Court’s reasoning is particularly important for the 
ECtHR, because the Court itself does not enjoy a system of coercive 
powers. As Helfer and Slaughter bring it out,  international courts, given the 
lack of coercive mechanisms, need to rely among other, on ‘their own 
legitimacy and the legitimacy of any particular judgment reached’.170 The 
Court has, compared to domestic courts, very little of law at their hands. 
The articles in the Convention do not say much. Pursuant to Article 32 
paragraph 1 of the Convention the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to 
all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention 
and the protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 
34, 46 and 47. The Court’s role is not only to apply the Convention, but also 
give the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ a present-day meaning.171
 
 
When we add to it the widely known facts that the caseload of the Court is 
very high and the time of the procedure very long, we see that the particular 
importance of the Court’s rulings lie in the quasi-lawgiving function in the 
field on human rights in Europe, and not so much as an effective procedure 
for individuals. 
 
A ‘checklist’ for effective supranational adjudication, according to Helfer 
and Slaughter, includes three sets of factors: those in control of the states 
party to an agreement of establishing a tribunal, those within the control of 
the tribunal itself and those that are often not subject to the control of either 
states or jurists.172 We are interested in the set of factors in control of the 
tribunal itself, because this paper talks about a suggestion with regard to the 
legal reasoning of the Court. The factors in control of the tribunal itself 
include the tribunals’ awareness of their audiences, their demonstrated 
autonomy from political interests, their incremental style of decisionmaking, 
the quality of their legal reasoning, their dialogue with other supranational 
tribunals, and the forms of their opinions.173
 
  
Importantly for our discussion, the quality of legal reasoning is important 
for an effective supranational adjudication. Judges on supranational 
tribunals also tend to attribute their relative success or failure, according to 
                                                 
170L. R. Helfer and A.-M. Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication’ , 107 Yale Law Journal  (1997) p. 285. 
171Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, ECtHR, no. 6833/74, para.41. 
172Helfer and Slaughter, supra note 170, p. 387. 
173Ibid., p. 308. According to the authors, many of these factors overlap; many may strike 
readers as the standard elements of “good  judging”. 
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their own measures, to the quality of their legal reasoning.174 According to 
observers, the ECtHR has benefited substantially from the quality of its 
reasoning.175 All scholars would probably acknowledge the value of 
“systemic and temporal coherence” as elements or attributes that make legal 
reasoning good.176 In particular, adherence to precedent, even when used 
only as authoritative guidepost and not as binding obligation, ensures a 
minimum degree of both temporal and systemic consistency; consistency 
with earlier decisions provides an autonomous bulwark of legitimacy.177 An 
additional increment of legitimacy flows from the quality of the decisions 
themselves, both past and present.178 Helfer and Slaughter suggest that the 
precise nature of the reasoning involved, whether deductive, syllogistic, 
analogical, or some combination of these styles, is less important than that 
judicial decisions be reasoned in the first place: reasons should explain why 
and how a particular conclusion was reached.179 They call the giving-
reasons requirement a prerequisite for the exercise of persuasive rather than 
coercive authority; a reasoned opinion assures individual litigants that their 
day in court was meaningful, in that their arguments were actually heard by 
the judge; the judge’s opinion both disseminates their arguments and 
dignifies them with a response.180
 
  
The development and firm application of a coherent standard in 
jurisprudence of the Court would certainly add to the legitimacy of the 
Court’s rulings, as well as the predictability of the Court’s decision. This 
was pointed out by McHarg, who found the Court’s failure to develop a 
coherent test for determining when rights prevail over the public interest or 
vice versa.181 According to McHarg, a fuller understanding at a conceptual 
level can help make sense of the inconsistencies at doctrinal level; a clear 
methodology would be preferable to what McHarg calls “confusion and 
disarray” in Strasbourg jurisprudence.182 Fudging the conceptual issue 
causes inconsistency and unpredictability, which represent a greater threat 
to judicial legitimacy than opting unequivocally for one or other 
methodological approach.183
                                                 
174Ibid., p. 318. 
 McHarg contends that in the absence of a 
theoretical solution to the problem of reconciling conflicting rights and 
public interest, greater procedural certainty and doctrinal clarity should be 
175Ibid., p. 319. 
176Ibid. 
177Ibid. 
178 Ibid., p. 320. 
179Ibid.  
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181McHarg, supra note 68, p. 695. 
182Ibid.  
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chosen, in order to provide the best available foundation for judicial 
legitimacy (in the context).184
 
   
In essence, the Court’s legality test is a rule created in case-law, in other 
words, a rule based on precedence. As indicated above, the Court has not 
limited the area of application of this rule literally. It has even mentioned 
that the rule is applicable to waivers of the rights listed in the Convention. 
Yet the Court has not applied the test to all the human rights waivers but 
only to those conducted in procedural matters. Our question is, would it be 
justified and would it add to the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions if the 
test would be applied extensively by the way of analogy? 
 
I answer that question affirmatively. We are in the situation where we have 
to decide whether to apply the rule, created in precedents, by analogy to 
other cases. Aleksander Peczenik has dealt with this issue of choice between 
analogy and argumentum e contrario.185
 
  
Although Peczenik dealt with analogy and argumentum e contrario in the 
context of statutory law, the same principles can be extended to a rule 
created in case-law. One of Peczenik’s contentions, as we shall see, even 
concerns only a rule created in precedence.  
 
The traditional origin of statutory analogy is that a so-called gap occurs in 
the statute.186
 
 As I have indicated in above, in the cases involving a conflict 
of individuals’ rights, the Court resorts to undefined arguments of margin of 
appreciation and striking the fair balance between rights of individuals. In 
such situation, it is justified to consider that there is a gap in law and we are 
in the position to assess if the resort to analogy would be justified.  
The prerequisites for an application of a rule by the way of analogy 
presupposes relevant resemblance of cases; an estimation of relevant 
resemblance can involve three steps.187 The first step is to establish that 
persons, things, documents, rights, duties, circumstances concerning space 
and time, etc., which occur in case bear a resemblance to the circumstances 
in the cases regulated by the provision.188
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 The second step is a prediction, 
based on these similarities, that an application of provision to case will 
produce relevantly similar social effects to those produced in cases which 
185A. Peczenik, On Law and Reason (Springer Science + Business Media B. V. 2009) 
p. 323. 
186Ibid., p. 321 
187Ibid., p. 321. 
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are regulated by this provision and the third step is to conclude that case 
thus should be treated similarly to cases regulated by the provision.189
 
  
Analogy can be justified by the principle ”like should be treated alike” and 
thus by considerations of justice and universalisability, the latter is a 
criterion of coherence.190
 
 
Argumentum e contrario on the other hand is a legal mode of reasoning 
arguing against the use of analogy; it is based on the assumption that the law 
should be respected.191 This demand is further supported by the value of 
fixity in the law and predictability of legal decisions.192 Peczenik has 
worked out reasoning norms which help one to make choice between the 
use of analogy and argumentum e contrario, which he stresses to be 
argument forms, supported by different set of reasoning norms and other 
principles which a judge has to weigh and balance and which enable to 
reach the conclusion justifiable in the circumstances.193 We are interested in 
these reasoning norms specifically when they relate to precedent law, 
because we are dealing with a rule created by case law. Luckily one of these 
rules is touching upon this issue. As the last rule, the rule number A10, 
Peczenik brings out that when interpreting rules based on precedents one 
may utilise argumentum e contrario only in exceptional cases.194
 
 
The reason why one should prefer analogy in interpreting precedent law, 
are: 
− the precedent decision does not establish any limit for the sphere of 
application or the rule it supports; 
− the point of precedent law is to obtain a pattern for analogous cases; 
to facilitate the creation of a general legal rule and not the precise 
scope of it; 
− since generality is a criterion for coherence, the practise of following 
precedents contributes to the coherence of the legal system and also 
to the fixity of the law.195
 
 
Peczenik concludes that a general rule covering the precedent is to be 
extended to analogous cases.196
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As brought out, the legality test for human rights waiver is brought out in 
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the case-law of the Court as a general rule. The Court refers to the test as 
applicable to a waiver of a right enlisted in the Convention and speaks of the 
test not indicating that the test is applicable only to certain rights and not the 
others.  
 
Thus, the theory of methods of legal reasoning supports the argument that 
the legality test of a human rights waiver, as a rule created by precedence 
law, should be used by analogy in similar cases. This would contribute to 
the coherence of the legal system as well as add to the fixity of the law. 
4.2.2 The wider use of the standard would be 
legitimate because the Court would be 
employing the consensus of the national 
law and practise of the states as a source 
of law  
The wider application of the test, as brought above, is possible and it could 
affect the result as well as the legitimacy as well as the predictability of the 
decisions of the Court. These reasons – the feasibility of the standard and 
potential to have an effect on the outcome of the procedure, however may 
fall short and we need more direct support in order to establish that a unified 
approach to all human right waivers is desirable. We are thus remained with 
the question if the application of the same test would be legally 
substantively justified. The Court does not explain why it is using the 
legality test for a human rights waiver nor does the Court explain why it is 
applying the test in selected cases. The Court is casuistic; deciding 
individual cases does not lend itself to broad statements of theory and it has 
been up to commentators to synthesise a set of principles which the Court 
uses in interpreting the Convention.197
 
 I am going to look into the sources of 
law at the Court’s hand and the methods of interpretation of the Convention 
in order to establish if the wider application of the test would be justifiable 
also arising from those viewpoints. In other words, I am going to look for 
justifications amongst the Court’s methodologies of interpretation. 
The Court, whose role is to interpret and apply the Convention,198
                                                 
197R. C. A. White and C. Ovey, The European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press Inc, New York, 2010) p. 81. 
 has 
established the principles of interpretation of the Convention in its case law. 
The most basic principles are concerned with the text of the Convention – 
regard must be had to the ordinary meaning of the words, the interpretation 
198Pursuant to Article 32 (1) of the Convention: The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to 
all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47. 
54 
 
must be in harmony with the context of the Convention and in the way the 
object and purpose of the treaty is best realised.199
 
 Pursuant to Article 1 of 
the Convention the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the 
Convention. The test is however not arising from the text of the Convention 
as a primary source of law for the Court. It has been developed by the Court 
in its case-law.  
Another methodology of the Court in interpreting the Convention in its 
jurisprudence is the comparative interpretation. It is based on the principle 
that the interpretation of the Convention may legitimately be based on 
common tradition of constitutional laws and a large measure of legal 
tradition common to the countries of the Council of Europe.200 The Court 
pays special attention to the role of the consensus of the national law and 
practise of the States Parties in the sources of law and methods of 
interpretation201 and incorporates the consensus as the law of the 
Convention.202
 
 
As brought above, the test reflects the elements of the legality test for a 
waiver of a right in private law of European states. The test reflects the 
common ground among the States Parties to the Convention203
 
 and may 
therefore be used as a source of law in the comparative interpretation of the 
Convention. 
This brings me to a conclusion on why the application of the test is 
appropriate and legally justified to apply in cases concerning human rights 
waiver in private law relationship. It is rooted in the common consensus of 
the States Parties and can thus legitimately be used in the comparative 
interpretation. 
 
As brought out in section 2.2.2, the sphere of private life has expanded over 
time and covers almost all aspects of human life. The same human rights 
law applies to the exercise of personal freedom in public law relationship as 
to that in a private law relationship. The constitutionalisation of private law, 
as brought above in section 3.1, indicates that the private law regulating the 
contractual waiver of human right must comply with the requirements of 
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Article 8 of the Convention and the other provisions in the Convention.  
This further supports my claim in this thesis – that the same human rights 
law should apply to a human rights waiver regardless of the nature of the 
legal relationship – public or private. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
This thesis looks at a conflict situation of human rights norms – a situation 
whereby a person is waiving a human right while exercising the right to 
autonomy. The Court has developed a special legality standard to a human 
rights waiver in cases concerning procedural rights most probably because 
of the extremely vulnerable situation of an accused in criminal proceedings. 
Additionally, the waiver must comply with the requirements of Article 8 of 
the Convention.  
 
I suggest that stretching the ECtHR’s legality test for a human rights waiver, 
currently only used in the cases where the waiver has been conducted in a 
public law relationship, to other human rights waivers would provide a 
coherent framework for solving this conflict of norms.  
 
There is no presupposed difference in the weight or nature of human rights 
in public relationship or in private relationship. The areas of public law and 
private law can cover and do concern the same human rights.  Equally, the 
waivers of the human rights, whether conducted in a private law relationship 
or in a public law relationship, should weigh the same. The human rights 
protection in a private relationship may in some cases be even more 
important - the partner in that relationship can be unreliable. 
 
Finding what is “necessary in democratic society” and “striking fair 
balance” between the rights of individuals or those and the public interest is 
a vague principle that the Court uses when deciding a case concerning 
competitive rights of individuals. The identification of a waiver of a right 
and the application of the test of lawfulness of a waiver would add to the 
legitimacy of the Court’s decisions. This methodology can also lead to a 
different outcome in solving the case. The legality test is equally applicable 
in cases where the waiver is conducted in a private law relationship even 
when taking into consideration the specific role of the ECtHR.  
 
Substantial justifications for a unified application of the test are found in the 
idea of personal autonomy as a human right. The comparison of the Court’s 
test for legality of a waiver and the private law principles demonstrated that 
the essential criteria are analogous and it could even be claimed that the 
Court’s test for legality of a waiver is rooted in private law principles. This 
provides another justification - as the test is analogous to the test of legality 
of a waiver of a right in European private law, it is available to be used as a 
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source of law for the Court, for there is a consensus among the member-
states. 
 
It is not possible to draw a clear standard of a waiver of a right, which could 
be applicable in all circumstances. Waivers have different weight, volume 
and timeline. A human right waiver concerns the right to personal autonomy 
as well as the other human right – the right being waived. However, a 
standard with a varying extent could be applied in all cases, taking into 
account the particularities of the rights concerned and the circumstances of 
the case. It would bring about more clarity and legitimacy when compared 
to the use of the principle of striking fair balance between individual rights.      
 
The European Court of Human Rights could develop its case-law by 
extensive application of the legality standard for a waiver of a human right. 
This would benefit the coherency of the legal reasoning of the Court and 
add to the legitimacy of the decisions. 
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